Determinants of Audit Fee in Chinese Market: An empirical study by KE, RUNFENG/R
KE, RUNFENG/R (2013) Determinants of Audit Fee in 
Chinese Market: An empirical study. [Dissertation 
(University of Nottingham only)] (Unpublished) 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/26847/1/Disseretation.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
I 
 
        University of Nottingham 
 
 
 
 
 
     The Impact of Audit Fee on Audit 
Quality in UK 
 
 
 
 
 
            Menglu  Ni 
 
 
 
 
 
MSc Finance and Investment 
 
 
II 
 
The Impact of Audit Fee on Audit Quality 
in UK 
 
 
 
 
 
                      By 
 
             Menglu  Ni 
                      
                2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation presented in part 
consideration for the degree of  
   ³MSc Finance and Investment´ 
 
III 
 
Summary  
This thesis investigates the effect of audit fees on audit quality. Audit fees include the 
normal audit fees and abnormal audit fees. This paper examines how the audit quality 
proxy by the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals associated with the 
abnormal audit fees that we focused on. Through our research, we found that the 
abnormal audit fees are negatively related to the discretionary accruals. And the sign 
of the abnormal audit fees will determine the level of audit quality. The ABAFEE is 
negatively associated with the unsigned discretionary accruals when abnormal audit 
fees are positive. And when abnormal audit fees are negative, the ABAFEE is 
positively correlated with the unsigned discretionary accruals. It suggests that the 
audit quality would not be impaired by the high abnormal audit fees. We also test for 
other variables relating to the audit quality, and found that non-audit is not significant 
associated with the discretionary accruals while BIG4 accounting firms with the 
industry specific auditors help to improve the audit quality than non-BIG4.  
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Section I 
Introduction 
1.1 Background of study 
The conflict interest between the shareholders and managers devotes to the agency 
problem. That¶s why the independent auditor is needed to mitigate the agent-principal 
conflict and provide the assurance for the financial information. With a higher audit 
quality, it can reduce the likelihood of accounting fraud and illegal reporting practices, 
like manipulating earnings management.  
DeAngelo(1981a) has argued that audit quality depends on the joint probability of 
an auditor discovering and disclosing a problem in an accounting system. Inadequate 
audit effectiveness could lead to the bankruptcy of an organization. The collapse of 
Enron is an example that makes governments concerned the excessive offerings of 
non-audit services impair the independence of auditors, lead to lower audit quality 
(Knney et al. [2004];Hoitash et al. [2010]).Audit quality should be of the high 
standards to maintain the risk of bankruptcy at the lowest level. While audit fees, 
which also refer to the audit pricing or audit expense, determine the maximum audit 
costs that the accounting firms willing to pay and thus affect the level of audit quality. 
In this article, we will study the determinants of the audit quality and the impact of the 
audit fee on the audit quality. Prior audit quality research indicates that the audit 
failure group exhibits high levels of discretionary accruals. The results support that 
high level of the abnormal audit fees are associated with the audit quality.  
Audit quality is the guarantee of professional competence and independence 
indicates the audit subject (audit organizations and auditors) role in the audit object 
(audit object and content) to produce objective results.  
1.2 Motivation for the study 
Audit quality describes how well an audit detects and reports material 
misstatements of financial statements, reduces information asymmetry between 
management and stockholders and therefore helps protect the interests of stockholders. 
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However, problem is that accruals unlike crash items are accompanied with a degree 
of ambiguity which results in their reliability reduction. And regarding to the agency 
problem, proposed accruals can be manipulated by managers in financial reports and 
their reliability may come to be a question. We need to posit models to find out these 
problems and provide the empirical evidence.  
 
1.3Contributions to existing knowledge 
Several contributions to knowledge are made through this thesis. This paper 
represents a comprehensive study on audit quality. Using the current data of listed 
companies for the fiscal years during 2005-2008, we examine the determinant of audit 
quality and audit fees. From the audit fees model, we sort out the abnormal audit fees 
through the difference between the audit fees and normal audit fees. The investigation 
between the audit quality and abnormal audit fees concludes that the sign of the 
abnormal audit fees determines the level of audit quality. The positive abnormal audit 
fees contain the excessive incentives for auditors to compromise the independence 
and thus impair the audit quality.  Furthermore, we do some researches examine the 
influence of abnormal non-audit fees associated with the audit quality. And the results 
from the abnormal non-audit fees model suggest that there is no asymmetric 
nonlinearity in the association between the abnormal non-audit fees and audit quality.  
 
1.4 Structure of research 
  The structure of the research is divided into six sections. In this section, it talks 
about the background of the study, the motivation and contributions that it makes. In 
the next section, it focuses on the theoretical framework underpinning this study. It 
mainly discusses the agency theory and the definition of audit quality, which gives a 
detailed explanation on the demand for audit services and different levels of audit 
quality.  
  Section 3 reviews the prior studies and the results that have been done by other 
researchers. Based on the literature review, it comes up with three hypotheses for the 
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further analysis. Section 4 explains the methodology employed in this study. It 
explains the sample firm selection, the period of the study, the definitions and the 
measurements of the main variables. The description of the source of data, the data 
collection procedures and analysis procedures are also discussed.  
  Section 5 shows the results and discussions for the relationship between the audit 
fees and audit quality and other analysis. Finally, Section 6 provides an overall 
summary and limitations of this thesis.  
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                                 Section II 
                      Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This Section provides the theoretical framework for the present study. The main 
discussion is on the audit quality and its relationship with the audit fee. Many factors 
affect the audit quality: (1) the accounting firm audit quality factors: the accounting 
firm's quality control, the scale of Certified Public Accountants, Certified Public 
Accountants of non-audit services, accounting firms, legal responsibilities of the audit 
quality. (2)  The listed company audit quality factors: the governance structure of 
listed companies, the status of internal audit, personnel, and system specifications 
impact on audit quality. (3) The impact of audit quality in the audit market factors: the 
degree of perfection of the audit requirements of the market, low-cost audit pricing 
phenomenon on audit quality. We will then discuss the determinants of the audit 
quality. 
According to the previous research, whether the association between audit fees and 
audit quality is asymmetric depends on the sign of abnormal audit fees. The abnormal 
audit fees are the difference between actual audit fees and the expected, normal level 
of audit fees. Because of different levels of audit quality, an appropriate model for the 
measurement is required for the analysis. Several hypothesis related to the analysis of 
the fee-quality model are also discussed in this chapter. The association between the 
audit fee, audit quality and earning management are highlighted. Finally, the summary 
and conclusion are presented in last section. 
 
2.2 Agency theory and information asymmetry 
Variations in the level of conflict and information asymmetry are assumed to differ 
from firm to firm and may demand different levels of auditing and of audit quality 
( DeAngelo, 1981; Watt and Zinmmerman, 1986). The higher the agency cost, the 
larger the information asymmetries¶ gap and thus the higher the levels of audit quality 
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will be demanded (Basiruddin, 2011). The next section mainly emphasizes on the 
different levels of audit quality and relevant hypotheses. 
 
2.3 Different levels of audit quality and the three key hypotheses 
These three hypotheses are used to explain the demand of audit services and 
different levels of audit quality.  
2.3.1 Monitoring hypotheses 
The monitoring hypotheses, obviously, is to monitor managers¶ opportunist 
behavior and the credibility of the information provided by managers as well as 
consider how to improve the investors¶ opportunities to observe such assets. In order 
to achieve this, independent audits are needed to provide managers and potential 
investors with reliable verification and information on the value of assets. Therefore 
auditors play in a role in monitoring the information provided by managers and 
mitigate the agent-principal conflict. An independent audit can also mitigate financial 
statement fraud and illegal reporting and improves the internal control and operational 
efficiency of a firm (Wallace, 1980; Chow, 1982). With the monitoring function of the 
audit, managers will carefully prepare the financial reports and reduce the probability 
of material errors. In addition, it helps to improve existing internal control systems. 
Such restrictions and recommendations are able to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of a firm¶s operations.  
 
2.3.2 Information hypotheses 
The information hypotheses suggests that the audited financial information is vital 
for investors since it can reduce market-related and firm-specific risks, improve 
decision making and provide access to new information for investors. If the 
information asymmetry is higher, the agency conflicts will be higher. The audit 
services are demanded to provide high quality audit information to reduce the risk of 
information uncertainty. The accuracy of information is quite important for investors. 
According to the information hypothesis, financial information determines market 
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value. Investors require financial information in order to make a rational investment 
decision even though they are on the outside of a contract of agent and principal 
relationships.  
 
2.3.3 Signaling or reputation hypothesis 
The signaling hypothesis indicates that the auditor gives a signal on whether the 
reported financial statements can be reliable. The audit service helps the users of 
financial statements distinguish between honest and dishonest information. Same as 
the previous two hypotheses, it mitigates the agent-principal conflict and improves the 
firm¶s operation. The signaling hypothesis offers an explanation for different levels of 
audit quality. Auditors often build a reputation for their audit service thus users can 
choose the one they want. Once the seller¶s reputations have been established, they 
are then able to signal to the buyers that their products are endorsed with higher 
quality marks. Klein and Leffler (1981) suggest that firms with an established 
reputation are less likely to produce a low quality product because once the buyers are 
aware that they have purchased such a product, this information will quickly be 
disseminated to other buyers. Because it is unobservable and costly to measure the 
audit quality, the market tends to use good reputation, derived from large auditors, as 
a signal of a higher quality audit.  
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Section III 
           Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Introduction 
This section reviews the existing literature on three topics: audit quality, audit fee 
and earnings management. It first reviews the definition of audit quality and how it is 
measured, and this is followed by discussion and review of the audit fee. Previous 
studies of the earnings management, particularly those related to the motivation for 
earnings and earnings management measurement, are also reviewed. These reviews 
provide a general understanding of the areas of study that is being investigated in this 
thesis. 
Towards the end of this chapter, the discussion and reviews focus on the association 
between audit quality and audit fee in respect of constraining earnings management. 
These reviews help to identify similar studies that have been done and which provide 
potential evidence of research gaps that demand further investigation. For each of the 
main relationships, the development of tested hypotheses is also disclosed. Finally, the 
summary and conclusion are presented in the last section. 
 
3.2 Definition of audit quality 
DeAngelo(1981) had defined audit quality as ³the market assessed joint probability 
that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client¶s accounting system 
and (b) report the breach.´ Watts and Zimmerman (1986) simplify DeAngelo¶s 
definition where the part (a) refers to auditor¶s competence and the quantity of inputs 
devoted to the audit, while the part (b) refers to an auditor¶s independence.  
ICAEW (2002) suggests a definition for audit quality which is ³At its heart (audit 
quality) is about delivering an appropriate professional opinion by the necessary 
evidence and objective judgments.´ It means that when auditors provide adequate 
audit evidence, the regulators assume that such auditors have performed a quality 
auditing service.  
Audit quality includes the technical quality and service quality. Technical quality 
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consists of reputation capital, capability, expertise, experience and independence 
scales, while service quality is defined by responsiveness, empathy and the provision 
of NAS and client services. There are some factors that affect the quality of an audit. 
Wooten (2003) claims that audit firms, audit teams and the professional judgment or 
auditor independence are the principal factors that contribute to auditor quality. Since 
that the characteristics such as human resources, audit processes, industry expertise, 
supervision, audit planning included in these factors will directly contribute to the 
skill and competence of auditors in detecting errors and misstatements (Basiruddin, 
2011).  
In addition, FRC (2008) suggests five key drives for audit quality: (1) the audit firm 
culture, (2) skills and personal qualities of audit partners and staff, (3) the audit 
process, (4) usefulness of the audit reporting and (5) factors that are outside the 
control of the auditors. Therefore, through the internal governance mechanisms and 
regulatory requirements can help to improve audit quality.  
To sum up, audit quality can be described as the ability of an auditor to provide an 
independent audit which results in a financial statement that is free from misstatement, 
error and fraud. Since an audit¶s quality is influenced by three main parties (audit firm, 
audit¶ client and regulators), the attributes or factors that are associated with each 
group can be used as indicators for audit quality. (Basiruddin, 2011)  
 
3.3 Discussion on how to measure audit quality 
Through academic research, two potential measures of audit quality are associated 
with audit procedures: input and output-based measures separately. These two 
measures are based on choosing the right people to do the right thing and reflecting 
the accuracy of management¶s assertions. However, there exist limitations during the 
process of measurement. It is difficult to make sure the consistency of the input¶s 
attributes during the process of the audit engagement. And the result of an audit in the 
output-based measurements cannot be observable all the time without any business 
failures or the identification of misstatements. In order to improve the accuracy of 
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measuring the audit quality, three measures of audit quality will be employed based 
on auditor reputation and auditor independence points of view, namely, audit fees, 
NAS fees and industry specialist auditors.  
 
3.3.1 Audit fees 
Audit fees can be treated as a proxy for audit quality with some reasons as follows. 
Some existing research had found that higher audit fees are associated with higher 
audit quality in order to compensate for the high-price of reputation capital, auditors¶ 
industry specialization, as well as for increased audit effort. Thus audit fee is 
concerned with the signaling or reputation hypothesis. Firms with an established 
reputation are able to assure that their audit service is of a high quality. Because 
expanding resources and more efforts had been putted into, a fee premium will be 
added to these auditors¶ reputation for a better quality of service.  
Audit price can distinguish different levels of audit service. Audit firms like Big 4 
auditors charge high audit fees than non-Big 4 auditors for two reasons: higher audit 
quality and monopoly pricing. Higher audit price can motivate auditors¶ effort and 
result in a higher audit quality. 
However, some findings show that lower audit fees could also be associated with a 
perceived higher audit quality. The reason is auditor may take into consideration that 
firms bound by a strong internal control environment will probably have a lower audit 
risk thus reducing the audit effort and audit fees by means of an effective internal 
corporate governance mechanism. A decrease in audit fee indicates that auditors can 
benefit from strong corporate governance and thus the audit risk and cost of auditing 
is reduced. Both of these two contribute to a higher audit quality.  
Audit fee is a good indicator to measure the audit quality, while it is not perfect to 
completely reflect the audit quality. The numbers of audit hours which can accurately 
reflect the audit effort need to be considered as a proxy for audit quality. Deis and 
Giroux (1996) provide some empirical evidence that audit fees and audit hour are 
significantly related to audit quality in their analysis of three important attributes: 
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audit fees, audit hours and audit quality. Hence, it seems reasonable that more audit 
hours will lead to higher audit fees and promote a higher quality audit.  
 
3.3.2 NAS fees 
For the NAS fees, there has been a heated debate about it. Prior empirical studies 
provide inconsistent findings on the relationship between NAS and auditor¶s 
independence. Some studies argue that NAS has little impact on auditor independence 
(Ryan,2001;Craswell, 1999) and a few suggest that NAS provide feasible 
advantages(Lai and Krishnan, 2009). A number of empirical studies have been unable 
to find any association between NAS and auditor independence (Barkess and Simnett, 
1994; Craswell, 1999; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; DeFound et 
al., 2002), whereas other studies provide evidence that the joint provision of NAS 
impairs auditor independence( Wines, 1994; Firth, 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; 
Raghunandan, 2003; Shaema and Sidhu 2001; Larcker and Richadson, 2004).  
Though the NAS fees enhance an auditor¶s knowledge and competency, it has also 
been argued that the higher provision of NAS is believed to compromise auditor 
independence and result in a lower audit quality.  
 
3.3.3 Industry specialist auditors 
Industry specialist auditors have got specific knowledge, resources, incentives and 
experience for different industries and separate the information component from noise. 
The industry specific knowledge and competency of the auditor are more able to 
assist their clients in developing industry specific disclosure strategies and enhance 
the informative of discretionary accruals by constraining aggressive and opportunist 
reporting of accruals by managers. There is positive relationship between industry 
specialist auditors and disclosure quality. Evidence shows that the possession of 
industry specialist knowledge improves auditor performance. In addition, auditors 
with industry specific experience are more likely to constrain earnings management 
and the opportunistic behavior of management. They have got rich experience about 
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the specific industry and effectively improve the operation of the organizations. 
It is found that firms which switch from a Big 4 non-specialist to a Big 4 specialist 
auditor will experience a significant positive abnormal return. These findings indicate 
that the market perceives audit quality differences based on industry specialization. 
The industry specialist knowledge obviously improves the efficiency and 
effectiveness of audit processes and thus increases the quality of auditing services. 
The use of an industry specialist auditor not only improves the quality of auditing 
work but is also perceived to be valuable to market participants.  
 
3.4 Analysis of the relationship between the audit fee and audit 
quality 
According to the existing literature, the standards to measure the audit quality are 
not uniformed. Watts, Zimmerman and DeAngelo(1981) found the firm size can be 
used to measure the level of audit quality. DeAngelo (1981) proved that the larger of 
the firm, the smaller the quasi-rent relation to each specific customer accounts for the 
entire sum of the proportion of quasi-rent, the less likely the firm to opportunistic 
motives to act and the higher the firm's audit quality can be expected. Caeter et 
al.(1998) pointed out that the reputation can be applied to evaluate the level of the 
audit quality. Accounting firms with a high reputation have to pay more in the event 
of audit failure, so that they have more incentives to maintain a high audit quality. 
Donald R Reid and Gary A Giroux (1992) suggested that the audit hour can be used to 
measure the level of audit quality if there is no direct measurement. 
  
3.5 Definition of Earning management 
Schipper(1989) defines earnings management ³in the sense of purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining 
some private gain´. Healy and Wahlen(1999) claim that earnings management occurs 
when the managers use their judgment in preparing financial statements with the 
intention not to report the firm¶s actual economic performance or in order to gain 
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benefit from the ³adjusted figure´. Therefore, earnings management can be viewed as 
the opportunistic behavior of management.  
Because of the compensation contracts associated with managers¶ private gains, 
agents manipulate earnings of financial statements to benefit themselves. Only 
meeting the earnings¶ target within the accounting procedures, the agents¶ bonus 
reward can be realized. Thus the opportunistic behavior of agents is motivated by the 
bonus-related contracts. Prior studies show that managers select income-increasing 
accruals when the bonus plans are falling below the lower bond, and vice-versa. 
Managers often manipulate earnings in order to reduce the divergence of reported 
earnings and to ensure that the current earnings reach the normal or expected target.  
In general, market participants and stakeholders appear to reward the firms with 
positive or higher earnings more than the firms with negative or lower earnings, and 
therefore managers manipulate earnings to meet these expectations. There is a high 
probability that firms manipulate earnings when patterns of increasing earnings occur. 
Managers often use their discretion to manipulate reported earnings, in the next 
section accruals-based discretion will be discussed.  
 
3.5.1 Accruals-based measure of earnings management  
When manipulate the earnings, managers are more favor towards the accruals 
accounting due to low cost and difficult to observe. The accruals contain two aspects, 
the discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. The discretionary accruals 
also can be called abnormal accrual or managed accruals, which always related to 
earnings manipulation. The non-discretionary accruals therefore is referred as normal 
accruals or non-managed accruals.  
There are three main measures of discretionary accruals in the prior literature. 
These include the aggregate accruals models, specific accruals models and the 
frequency distribution approach. Several models are introduced in relation to the 
aggregate accruals such as Healy¶s(1985) model, DeAngelo¶s (1986) model, 
Jone¶s(1991) model, the modified Jone¶s model from Dechow et al.(1995) and the 
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performance-adjusted discretionary accruals model by Kothari et al.(2005). The main 
differences between the models are how the research partitions the non-discretionary 
accruals component from the total accruals and their ability to accommodate changes 
in firm¶s economic condition. Among these models, the aggregate accruals models 
give rise to more comprehensive research design in capturing the discretionary 
components. 
 
3.6 Definition of Audit fee 
Actual audit fees consist of two parts: (1) normal fees that reflect auditors¶ effort 
costs, litigation risk, and normal profits (Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2008, 2009) and (2) 
abnormal fees that are specific to an auditor-client relationship (Higgs and Skantz, 
2006). Normal fees are mainly determined by factors that are common across different 
clients, such as client size, client complexity, and client-specific risk, while abnormal 
fees are determined by factors that are idiosyncratic auditor-client relationship. 
Kinney and Libby (2002, 109) described the abnormal fee that ³may more accurately 
be likened by attempted bribes´ and can better capture economic rents associated with 
audit services or an auditor¶s economic bond to a client than normal fees or actual 
fees.  
Abnormal audit fees can be positive and negative. When abnormal fees are positive, 
the association between abnormal audit fees and audit quality is negative. The higher 
the abnormal audit fees, the lower the audit quality. The reason is that excessive audit 
fees can create incentives for auditors to acquiesce to client pressure for substandard 
reporting and thus erode audit quality. When abnormal audit fees are close to zero or 
negative, auditors have few incentives to compromise audit quality. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the association between abnormal audit fees and audit quality is 
asymmetric and nonlinear, depending on whether audit fees are positive or negative 
(Basiruddin, 2011).  
 
3.7 Hypotheses Development 
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3.7.1 The association between audit fee and audit quality 
Most of the studies argue that the provision of non-audit service impair the auditor 
independence and audit quality. However, not only non-audit service influences the 
auditors¶ reporting decisions, another key element is excessively high audit fees. 
Frank et al. (2002) report that the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals is 
negatively associated with the percentile ranks of audit fees, suggesting that auditors 
are less likely to allow biased financial reporting by high-fee clients than by low-fee 
clients. 
We will examine the associate between the audit quality and audit fee using an 
extended set of audit fee data and a different audit metric, namely, abnormal audit fees 
instead of actual audit fees. And we measure audit quality using the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals. 
 
3.7.2 The sign of abnormal audit fees effect on audit quality 
Choi et al. (2009) document, the proxy for audit quality is insignificant associated 
with abnormal audit fees for total sample of clients firms with both positive and 
negative abnormal fees. However, when separate total observations into those with 
positive abnormal fees and those with negative abnormal fees, the results change 
dramatically. When the abnormal fees are positive, the magnitude of absolute 
discretionary accruals is positively associated with abnormal fees, suggesting a 
negative relation between audit quality and positive abnormal fees. But the 
association is insignificant when the abnormal fees are negative. These findings imply 
that positive and negative abnormal fees create different incentive effects: for clients 
with positive abnormal fees, auditors are more likely to acquiesce to client pressure as 
abnormal audit fee increase, whereas for clients with negative abnormal fees, auditors 
are unlikely to compromise audit quality. 
These findings have some reasonable explaining. When the auditor receives 
unusually high audit fees from a client, which means the abnormal audit fees are 
positive, the auditor can allow the client to engage in opportunistic earnings 
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management. For clients with positive abnormal fees, the benefits to the auditor for 
acquiescing to client pressure for opportunistic earnings management can outweigh 
the associated costs like increased litigation risk and loss of reputation. We first 
hypothesize in the followings forms: 
H1: There is a positively relationship between the magnitude of abnormal accruals 
and abnormal audit fees when the clients pay positive abnormal audit fees. 
On the other hand, when the abnormal audit fees are negative, auditors have few 
incentives to compromise audit quality by acquiescing to client pressure for standard 
reporting. The reason is that the benefit to auditors for retaining these unprofitable 
clients is not great enough to cover the expected costs associated with substandard 
reporting. It is quite possible that the more negative the abnormal audit fees, the lower 
the incentives for auditors to compromise independence and the higher the audit 
quality. We therefore hypothesize in an alternative form: 
H2: There is an insignificantly relationship between the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals and abnormal audit fees when the clients pay negative abnormal audit fees.  
 
3.7.3 Non-audit fee & audit quality  
Fees paid to auditors can affect audit quality in two ways: large fees paid to 
auditors may increase the effort exerted by auditors, hence, increasing audit quality. 
Alternatively, large fees paid to auditors, particularly those that are related to 
non-audit services, make auditors more economically dependent on their clients. Such 
financial reliance may induce a relationship whereby the auditor becomes reluctant to 
make appropriate inquires during the audit for fear of losing highly profitable 
fees(Hoitash et al., 2007).  
There are some arguments that the non-audit fees may impair audit quality, in other 
words, reduce the auditor independence. Due to the collapse of Enron, governments 
are concerned that excessive offering of non-audit services may impair the 
independence of auditors, lead to lower quality audits, and increase the likelihood of a 
financial reporting that violates generally accepted accounting principles (Kinney et 
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al.[2004],Hoitash et al.[2010]). DeAngelo gave the reason that if non-audit services 
provide auditors with client-specific rents, companies may be able to obtain more 
favorable reports by threatening to switch auditor: in this case, non-audit services may 
reduce independence. In addition, Frankel et al. (2002) has used the association 
between audit firm fees and two measures of biased financial reporting-firms¶ 
discretionary accruals and the likelihood of firms meeting earnings benchmarks-to 
draw inferences on auditor independence. Their findings prove that auditor 
independence is comprised when clients pay high non-audit fees relative to total fees. 
However, there exist some other different opinions, like non-audit services are 
thought to increase auditor¶s client knowledge and therefore increase the probability 
that problems can be discovered. Thus, for a given level of independence, non-audit 
may increase audit quality. The theoretical relationship between non-audit services 
and audit quality is ambiguous. To provide empirical evidence on this, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: There is an insignificantly relationship between the non-audit fee and 
discretionary accruals.  
 
3.7.4 Industry specialist auditors & audit quality 
  Prior research found that higher audit quality associated with BIG 4 auditors 
who are able to constrain aggressive and opportunist reporting of discretionary 
accruals by their clients and thereby improve the ability of discretionary accruals to 
predict future levels of profitability. Craswell et.al (1995) indicated that BIG 4 
auditors devote more resources to staff training and development of industry expertise 
relative to non-BIG4 auditors. Because their size, BIG 4 auditors are also likely to 
invest in information technology and employ state of the art techniques to detect 
earnings management than non-BIG4 auditors. To provide empirical evidence on this, 
we test the following hypothesis: 
H4: There is a negatively relationship between the firms audited by BIG 4 and 
discretionary accruals.  
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Section IV Data and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This Section presents the methodology used to test the hypotheses outlined in 
Section 3. The first section explains and justifies the sample firms selected and time 
period which the investigation was carried out. The Section then outlines the 
definitions and measurements of the hypotheses variables. The model specifications 
and related control variables, the sources of data and the data analysis procedures are 
also discussed.  
 
4.2 Sample firms and period of study 
We obtain audit fee data from the database FAME. The sample population for this 
study is the listed companies, which include some variables concerned with the 
market value, like the book-to-market ratio. These firms are selected because they 
include a broad range of industrial and commercial activities and account for a 
significant portion of the UK economic output. The study examines a sample period 
of the fiscal years 2005-2008, which include the financial crisis that will have 
significant influence on this study. The Standard Industrial Classification Code was 
introduced in July 2003 and updated in 2007. It can be used for classifying business 
establishments and other statistical units by the type of economic activity in which 
they are engaged.  
 
4.2.1 Sample selection for regression analysis 
The initial sample consists of 8205 firm-year observations for the period 2005-2008. 
These companies are listed companies chosen from the FAME. However, the present 
study excludes 2324 firms that operate in the financial and utilities sectors, due to 
their unique characteristics and to specific regulations which may affect the results. 
The sample size then has been reduced by further 3156 firm-year observations as a 
result of missing information in DataStream and Fame. After the eliminations, the 
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remaining sample is of 2725 firm-year observations. The sample selection procedure 
is summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1: Sample selection procedures 
Description 2005 2006 2007 2008 Pooled 
Initial sample Excluded: 1641 1641 1641 1641 8205 
Financial and Utilities firms 465 465 465 465 2324 
Missing data from Fame 639 1176 431 378 3156 
Final samples 537 645 745 798 2725 
 
The sample now ensures that each industry portfolio consists of at least ten 
observations in order to provide an unbiased estimation of different models. In Table 2 
Pane A and B, reported the distribution of the sample firms by year and industry.  
Table 2:  
Pane A: Distribution of sample firms by year 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 Pooled 
Sample N % N % N % N % N % 
size 537 19.7 645 23.67 745 27.34 798 29.23 2725 100 
Pane B: Distribution of sample firms by industry 
SIC Code      Super  Sector  Level   N Percent 
01        Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 18 0.066 
05-09     Mining and Quarrying 362 13.28 
10-30     Manufacturing 477 17.5 
40        Construction 233 8.55 
45-47     Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycle 129 4.73 
55-56     Accommodation and food service 
activities 88 3.23 
58-63     Information and communication 290 10.64 
68        Real estate activities 111 4.07 
69-74     Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 499 18.31 
77-82     Administrative and support service 
activities 372 13.65 
85        Education 21 0.077 
86        Human health and social work activities 21 0.077 
92-93     Arts, entertainment and recreation 67 2.46 
96        Other service activities 32 1.17 
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98        Activities of households as employers; 
undifferentiated goods- and 
services-producing activities of 
households for own use 
10 0.018 
Total 2725 100 
 
4.3 The definition and measurement of the hypothesis variables 
The variables of interest examined in this study are explained in this section. There 
are three main variables to be examined: (1) the audit quality proxies; (2) the audit fee 
proxies; (3) the association between the audit quality and audit fee.  
 
4.3.1 Measurement of Discretionary Accruals 
We use discretionary accruals (DA) as a proxy for audit quality because it often 
contains two elements, one is the noise caused by PDQDJHUV¶ aggressive and 
opportunist reporting, the other is the insider information that managers communicate 
privately. In this paper, we will consider using three different models of DA: the Jones 
(1991), the modified Jones (1991) and the performance-adjusted model by Kothari et 
al(2005). The Jones(1991) and the modified Jones models are recognized in the 
literature as the most powerful models for detecting earnings management(Dechow et 
al., 1995; Young, 1999). The performance-adjusted discretionary accruals by Kothari 
et al.(2005) controls the variations of non-discretionary accruals by taking into 
account the change in total assets, revenues, receivables as well as the firm¶s 
performance(e.g. return on assets). The discretionary accruals are estimated using a 
cross-sectional variation.  
 
4.3.1.1 Discretionary accruals under the Jones model 
Firstly, we need to estimate the non-discretionary accruals using the following 
model. Through the OLS regression, each industry comes out with the different 
coefficients Į 1, Į 2,Į 3 in each year. Then estimate the error term in the regression 
model. The error term is the difference between the total accruals and 
non-discretionary accruals.  
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୘୅େେ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ=Į 1 ଵ୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ+Į 2ᇞୖ୉୚౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ +Į 3 ୔୔୉౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ+eijt             (1) 
DACCij= 
୘୅େେ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ -Į 1 ଵ୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ -Į 2ᇞୖ୉୚౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ  -Į 3 ୔୔୉౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ      
Where: 
DACCij= discretionary accruals for sample firm I in industry j for year t; 
TACCijt= total accruals for sample firm i in industry j for year t 
TAijt-1=total assets for sample firm i in year j for year t-1 
ƸREVijt=change in account receivables for sample firm i in industry j for year t 
PPEijt=gross property plant and equipment for sample firm I in industry j for year t 
eijt=error term for sample firm I in industry j for year t 
The total accruals are computed as earnings before extraordinary items and earnings 
before discontinued operations, less the net cash flows from operating activities.  
 
4.3.1.2 Discretionary accruals under the modified Jones model 
The difference between modified Jones (1991) model and the original Jones model 
is that the modified one takes into account accounts receivable. The steps to calculate 
the discretionary accruals are similar to the original Jones model. The model is as 
follows: ୘୅େେ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ=Į 1 ଵ୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ+Į 2ᇞୖ୉୚౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ +Į 3 ୔୔୉౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ+eijt          (2) 
DACCij =
୘୅େେ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ -Į 1 ଵ୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ -Į 2ᇞୖ୉୚౟ౠ౪ିᇞୖ୉େ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ  -Į 3 ୔୔୉౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ 
Where: 
DACCij= discretionary accruals for sample firm I in industry j for year t-1; 
TACCijt= total accruals for sample firm i in industry j for year t 
TAijt-1=total assets for sample firm i in year j for year t-1 
ƸRECijt=change in account receivables for sample firm i in industry j for year t 
ƸREVijt=change in revenues for sample firm i in industry j for year t  
21 
 
PPEijt=gross property plant and equipment for sample firm I in industry j for year t 
eijt=error term for sample firm I in industry j for year t 
 
4.3.1.3 Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Accruals 
The lagged ROA is added on the modified Jones (1991) model based on the 
foregoing and since prior research documents a correlation between discretionary 
accruals estimates and firm performance. Similarly, the non-discretionary accruals 
needed to be estimated using the OLS regression and obtain the coefficients of 
different industries. Then, the error terms are estimated according to the difference 
between the total accruals and the non-discretionary accruals. It is the discretionary 
accruals that we needed. The model is as follows: ୘୅େେ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ=Į 1 ଵ୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ+Į 2ᇞୖ୉୚౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ +Į 3 ୔୔୉౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ+Į 4ROAijt-1+eijt     (3) 
DACCij = 
୘୅େେ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ -Į 1 ଵ୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ -Į 2ᇞୖ୉୚౟ౠ౪ିᇞୖ୉େ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ  - Į 3 ୔୔୉౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ - Į 4ROAijt-1 
Where: 
DACCij= discretionary accruals for sample firm I in industry j for year t-1; 
TACCijt= total accruals for sample firm i in industry j for year t 
TAijt-1=total assets for sample firm i in industry j for year t-1 
ROAijt-1=return on assets for sample firm I in industry j for year t-1 
ƸRECijt=change in account receivables for sample firm i in industry j for year t 
ƸREVijt=change in revenues for sample firm i in industry j for year t  
PPEijt=gross property plant and equipment for sample firm I in industry j for year t 
eijt=error term for sample firm I in industry j for year t 
 
4.3.2 Measurement of Abnormal Audit Fees 
The actual audit fees are divided into two parts, one is the expected component, 
normal audit fee and the other is the unexpected component, abnormal audit fee. 
Based on the existing literature on audit fee determinants (e.g., Chaney et al/ 2004; 
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Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2002; Sankaraguruswamy and Wisenant 2005; 
Whisenant et al. 2003), the model is as follows: 
AFEEjt=Į 0+Į 1LNTAjt+Į 2NBSjt+Į 3INVRECjt+Į 4EMPLOYjt+Į 5FOREIGNjt+Į
6LOSSjt+ Į 7LOSSLAGjt+ Į 8LEVEjt+ Į 9ROAjt+ Į 10LIQUIDjt+ Į 11BIG4jt+ Į
12SHORT_TENjt+ Į 13BTMjt+ Į 14CHGSALEjt+ Į 15PENSIONjt+ Industry&Year 
Dummies+ error term              (4) 
Where, for client firm j in year t, the variables are defined as follows: 
AFEEjt = natural log of actual fees paid to auditors for their financial          
statement audits (i.e. audit fees) in thousands of dollars in industry j for year t 
LNTAjt = natural log of total assets in thousands of dollars in industry j for year t 
NBSjt = natural log of 1 plus the number of business segments in industry j for year t 
INVRECjt = inventory and receivables dividend by total assets in industry j for year t 
EMPLOYjt = square root of the number of employees in industry j for year t 
FOREIGNjt = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax and 0 otherwise in industry j 
for year t 
LOSSjt = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year and 0 otherwise in industry j  
for year t 
LOSSLAGjt = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the prior year and 0 otherwise  
in industry j for year t 
LEVEjt = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets) in industry j for year t 
ROAjt = return on assets (income before extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets) in industry j for year t              
LIQUIDjt = current assets divided by current liabilities in industry j for year t 
BIG4jt = 1 if the auditor is one of the BIG4 and 0 otherwise in industry j for year t 
SHORT_TENjt = 1 if the auditor is the first or second year of the audit  
engagement and 0 otherwise in industry j for year t 
BTMjt = book-to-market ratio in industry j for year t 
CHGSALEjt = sales change from the prior year divided by the prior year¶s  
beginning total assets in industry j for year t 
PENSIONjt = 1 if the firm has a pension or post-retirement and 0 otherwise  
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in industry j for year t 
 
The demand for audit services is likely to increase with firm size, leading to a 
positive association between firm size and audit fees. We include LNTA and 
EMPLOY to control client size. Audit fees are likely to be higher for clients with 
more complex business operations. We include the variables NBS, NGS, INVERC, 
FOREIGH, and EXORD to proxy for client complexity. All the coefficients of the 
aforementioned variables are expected to be positive (Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 
2008). 
In Eq. (4), we include LOSS, LOSSLAG,LEVE, LIQUID and ROA to proxy for a 
client¶s risk characteristics. Since auditors charge higher fees for risky clients 
(Simunic and Stein, 1996), we predict that the coefficients of LOSS, LOSSLAG, and 
LEVE are positive whereas those of ROA and LIQUID are negative. We include 
BIG4 to capture the effect of audit quality differentiation on audit fees. A positive 
coefficient of BIG4 means the existence of fee premiums for high-quality auditors, 
namely, the BIG4. The SHORT-TEN variable is included to control fee discounting at 
initial audit engagements (Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant, 2005). Firms involved 
in equity and debt offerings are in a greater need of audit services (Reynolds et al. 
2004). In addition, the demand for audit services is greater for high-growth firms than 
for low-growth firms (Choi and Wong 2007). To control for these effects, we include 
ISSUE, CHGSALE, and BTM (an inverse measure of growth potential). Following 
Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant(2005) and Whisenant et al. (2003), we add the 
indicator variables PENSION, which represent the existence of pension or 
post-retirement plans, accounting restatements, and reportable events or disagreement 
between auditors and client firms, respectively. Finally, we include 12 industry 
indicator variables as used by Frankel et al.(2002) and year indicator variables to 
control for industry and yearly differences.  
 
4.3.3 Model for the association between abnormal audit fees and audit 
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quality 
To examine the association between abnormal audit fees and audit quality and 
whether it is asymmetric between clients with positive versus negative abnormal audit 
fees, we derive abnormal fees using a fee estimation model drawn from prior 
literature which takes into account not only the company¶s size, but also its 
complexity, risk, and other factors that may affect the fees charged by the auditor 
(Hoitash et al., 2007). Here we posit the following model that links the magnitude of 
unsigned or signed discretionary accruals with our test variable, namely, abnormal 
audit fees (ABAFEE) and the other control variables, we employ tests using the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals for the same period between 2005 and 2008. 
Using the unsigned value of abnormal accruals more completely identifies the 
discretion afforded managers by their auditors and in this context does not require 
assumptions about auditor bias with regard to the directional effect of an accounting 
choice (Menon and Williams, 2004). 
|DA| =ȕ O+ȕ 1POS_ABAF+ȕ 2ABAFEE+ȕ 3NEG_ABAF+ȕ 4LNTA+ 
ȕ 5BIG4+ȕ 6BTM+ȕ 7CHGSALE+ȕ 8 LEVE +ȕ 9 AUDCHG +ȕ 10 CFO +industry 
and year dummies + error term                                            
(5) 
Where, for each firm and in each year, the variables are defined as follows:  
|DA| = the magnitude of unsigned (signed) discretionary accruals  
POS_ABAF = the firm has positive abnormal fees (ABAFEE>0)  
ABAFEE = abnormal audit fees estimated from Eq.(4) 
NEG_ABAF = the firm has positive negative fees (ABAFEE<0)  
LNTA= natural log of total assets in thousands of dollars 
BIG4= 1 if the auditor is one of the BIG4 and 0 otherwise 
BTM= book-to-market ratio 
CHGSALE= sales change from the prior year divided by the prior year¶s  
beginning total assets 
LEVE= leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets) 
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AUDCHG = 1 if the firm¶s auditor is in the first year of an audit engagement and 
otherwise 
CFO = cash flow from operations divided by lagged total assets 
 
This model shows the determinants of audit fees, the various factors that dependent 
on the audit quality. The factors include the firm size, the BIG4 auditors, Change of 
sales, loss, leverage, issue and so on. Previous research shows that large firms tend to 
have more suitable and predictable operations and hence report a lower level of 
discretionary accruals than small firms (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002). The LNTA is 
a control for the size effect. And evidence shows that the BIG 4 auditors are more 
effective than non-BIG 4 auditors in constraining managers¶ abilities to manage 
earnings and thus we include BIG4 to control for the effect. We include BTM and 
CHGSALE to control for the potential effects of firm growth on the extent of earnings 
management. Firms with high leverage can have incentives to boost reported earnings 
due to their concerns over debt covenant or private lending agreement violations and 
LEVE is therefore included to control for this effect. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Kim 
et al. (2003) , among others, find that firms involved in financing tranctions tend to 
engage in earnings management more aggressively than those that are not. We include 
ISSUE to control for the effect. We also include AUDCHG because auditor change is 
related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998). 
Discretionary accruals are positively correlated with firm performance (Kasznik 
1999; Kothari et al. 2005) and it is therefore important to control for the effect of firm 
performance on discretionary accruals. We include CFO to address the problem. 
Finally, we include industry and year dummies to control for possible variations in 
accounting standards and regulations across industries and over time. 
 
4.4 Data analysis procedures 
To analysis the data, the statistical software STATA 10 is used. The data analysis 
includes descriptive statistics, the correlation matrix, multivariate regression and 
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robustness tests. Each of these is now reviewed.  
 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Descriptive statistics describes the sample data on a single variable in an organized 
form. It includes the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, first 
quartile and third quartile. The mean, median, first quartile, third quartile and standard 
deviation measure the central tendency of the variable.  
The correlation among the variables is shown by pair wise correlation matrix. This 
explains the degree of linear association between two variables and range from +1 to 
-1, where a correlation of f1 means that there is a perfect linear relationship 
between the variables. However, according to Hair et al.(2010:200), a high degree of 
inter correlation among the independent variables may cause problems of 
multicollineartiy when the correlation coefficient is above f0.90. Multicolinearity 
may substantially affect the predictive ability of the regression model as well as the 
estimation of the regression coefficients. 
 
4.4.2 Multivariate regression 
The multivariate regression use ordinary least square regression to examine the 
relationship between single dependent variables and several independent variables. 
There are five assumptions concerned with the OLS regression model, and they are as 
follows: 
(1) Normality- the errors(residuals) should be normally distributed 
(2) Linearity- the relationship between the predictors and the response variable should 
be linear 
(3) Homoscedasticity- the error variance should be constant 
(4) Independent- the errors associated with one observation should not be correlated 
with the errors of other observations 
(5) Multicollinearity- there should be no exact collinearity among predictors 
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4.4.3 Further analysis and robustness test 
Several tests were performed after the multivariate regression analysis. The purpose 
of these additional tests was to give reasonable assurance that the main findings were 
robust to the various model specifications. The robustness tests include tests for 
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity, various regression estimators, client size 
analysis, and tests for additional control variables and endogeneity. Because our 
sample includes the period during 2005 to 2008 and different industries, the results 
are required to check whether they are sensitive to year-specific or industry-specific 
factors.  
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                 Section V Findings and Discussions 
5.1 Introduction 
This Section mainly presents the findings and discussions for the empirical analysis 
of the association between the audit fee and audit quality. Basically, there are three 
models of the audit quality to be examined: the Jones model, the modified Jones 
model and the performance-adjusted model. Furthermore, the models of the audit fees 
will also be revisited.  
In the following paragraphs, the structure is organized as follows, first is about 
presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Then this is followed by 
estimation of the normal audit fees model, results of the multivariate tests using 
different samples and variables. And we will do further analysis to check the 
heteroscedasticity and muticollinearity. The last section summaries and conclude the 
chapter.  
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics results from 2005 to 2008; it is worth 
noting the followings. The mean values of all these three unsigned discretionary value 
are significantly larger than the fact that median values suggest that the DA 
distributions are skewed. And we can see, the mean value of signed discretionary 
accruals is close to zero which means the signed discretionary accruals approach the 
normal distribution. The mean value of AFEE variable is almost the same as the 
median value indicates that it is normally distributed. Nearly 12% of the sample firms 
pay income taxes for their business operations in non-UK tax jurisdiction. The mean 
value of the EMPLOY is nearly three times of the median value, the skewness is quite 
obvious. The data shows that there are about 33% of these companies experienced a 
loss in the current (prior) fiscal year and nearly half of them had their financial 
statements audited by one of the Big 4 auditors. Another finding is that only 15% of 
the firms had not started a pension or post-retirement plan. Only 9.21% of the firms in 
their first year of an audit engagement suggest most of the firms have got experienced 
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auditors. We can get limited information from Table 3.  
Table 3 
                      Distribution of variables 
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Median Max 
|DA1| 0.4398586 5.135936 0 0.0551 114.2497 
|DA2| 0.4266593 5.110451 0.0001061 0.0539133 114.2996 
|DA3| 0.4480879 5.237135 0.0001199 0.0492472 114.3436 
DA1 0.1399077 5.152871 -16.6461 0.0092 114.2497 
DA2 0.1658128 5.12558 -12.5898 0.009 114.2996 
DA3 0.1857584 5.253018 -17.9619 0.0046 114.3436 
AFEE 4.735681 1.654492 0.69 4.46 10.62 
LNTA 11.2287 2.608457 4.174387 10.76815 20.58958 
NBS 3.151818 1.441166 0 2.995732 8.24486 
INVREC 0.0636505 0.3209072 -3.595469 0.1167828 0.8780103 
EMPLOY 49.42762 81.37914 0 18.05547 640.3702 
FOREIGN 0.1199226 0.3251857 0 0 1 
LOSS 0.3249516 0.4688104 0 0 1 
LOSSLAG 0.1605416 0.3674631 0 0 1 
LEVE 3.434315 0.9709164 -10.89968 3.45979 8.05008 
ROA -2.714391 39.97544 -492.09 5.36 51.2 
LIQUIDITY 2.844584 7.137265 0.11 1.19 77.82 
BIG4 0.4235977 0.4946068 0 0 1 
BTM 18.98204 253.8781 -198.67 1.947 4561.895 
CHGSALE 0.2309545 2.554624 -20.90358 0.0705279 52.01896 
PENSION 0.8336557 0.3727501 0 1 1 
CFO -0.37152 6.468839 -114.4583 0.074079 22.27955 
SHORT_TEN 0.1373308 0.3445296 0 0 1 
AUDCHG 0.0921569 0.2895312 0 0 1 
 
5.3 Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix for all variables from 2005 to 2008 indicated in the audit 
quality-audit fee model is presented in Table 4. As shown in the table, CFO is highly 
negatively correlated with the signed and unsigned discretionary accruals when using 
the performance-adjusted model (-0.9974 and -0.9832 respectively). This may 
suggests that firms with a high operating cash flow are associated with a low level of 
discretionary accruals. With respect to the structure of correlations among our 
explanatory variables, it is worth noting the followings. First, LNTA is negatively 
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correlated with all unsigned discretionary accruals. Other variables like ABAFEE, 
LEVE, BTM and AUDCHG are positively correlated with unsigned discretionary 
accruals. This suggests that small firms or firms with high abnormal audit fees, highly 
levered firms, firms with a high book to market ratio and firms with first year audit 
engagement are associated with a high level of abnormal fees. Then except for the 
previous ones, the correlation coefficients for the other pairs of variables are not large. 
Overall, the correlation statistics shown in Table3 indicates that the results of our 
multivariate regressions are unlikely to suffer from multicollinearity problems, but we 
will also check whether this problem truly exists.  
 
Table 4 Pair wise correlation matrix (N=2725) 
 
DA1  |DA1|  DA2  |DA2|  DA3  |DA3|  ABAFEE  LNTA  LEVE  BIG4  BTM  CFO  CHGSALE  AUDCHG 
DA1 
|DA1| 
DA2 
|DA2| 
DA3 
|DA3| 
ABAFEE 
LNTA 
LEVE 
BIG4 
BTM 
CFO 
CHGSALE 
AUDCHG 
1.0000  
-0.6682  1.0000 
0.5799  -0.2559 1.0000  
-0.4627   0.7452  -0.5114  1.0000 
0.0361  -0.0077   0.1101   0.0024  1.0000 
-0.1027   0.1121  -0.0293   0.1167   0.9702   1.0000 
-0.0090   0.0150  -0.0352   0.0298  -0.0429  0.0498   1.0000 
0.2842  -0.2685   0.0787  -0.2068  -0.0064  -0.0682  -0.0071   1.0000 
0.3162  -0.3317   0.2826  -0.3190   0.0427   0.0062  -0.0371  0.0715   1.0000 
0.0896  -0.1639  -0.0204  -0.1322   0.0570   0.0275  -0.0005  0.5811   0.0772   1.0000 
0.0158  -0.0064   0.0135  -0.0081   0.0012  -0.0024   0.0034   -0.0538   0.0122  -0.0401 1.0000 
0.0154  -0.0142  -0.0117  -0.0119  -0.9774  -0.9832   0.0452  0.0396  -0.0027  -0.0355   0.0000    1.0000 
-0.0181  -0.0060  -0.3062   0.1660   0.0024   0.0080  -0.0205  0.0172  -0.0302   0.0142  -0.0176   0.0302    1.0000 
-0.0156   0.0650  -0.0194   0.0855   0.1394   0.1677  -0.0082   -0.0636  -0.0456   0.0281  -0.0127  -0.1624   0.0047    1.0000 
 
5.4 Estimation of the Discretionary Accruals Model 
  In Table 5, it shows the results on estimation of the discretionary accruals with 
three models. We use the sample of SIC Code 05-09, which is the Mining and 
Quarrying, in the 2005 with 57 observations. As we can see from the Table 5, the 
results are quite good for that the variables are significant associated with the 
dependent variable, like the variable 
ଵ୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ is significant negatively correlated with 
the variable
୘୅େେ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ, while ୔୔୉౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ is positively correlated. And the R-squared is 
average 85% which has a high explanatory power. Therefore, we can obtain the 
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discretionary accruals from these three models and may receive good results for the 
following models.  
 
Table 5 Results on Estimation of the Discretionary Accruals 
Variables  
 
Jones Model 
 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Performance-adju
sted  
Model 
 
Using 
୘୅େେ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ as the dependent variable 
     
ଵ୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ -336.7*** -314.6*** -355.8*** 
 (-13.54) (-8.72) (-12.42) 
   
ᇞୖ୉୚౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ  0.507***   
 (28.76)   
    
୔୔୉౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ 0.168** 0.819*** -0.0138 
 (2.69) (11.27) (-0.12) 
  
ᇞୖ୉୚౟ౠ౪ିᇞୖ୉େ౟ౠ౪୘୅౟ౠ౪షభ   -0.375*** 0.192** 
  (-19.00) (2.77) 
ROAijt-1   -0.00157 
   (-1.37) 
_cons 0.0521 -0.0377 0.0678 
 (1.30) (-0.66) (1.68) 
N 57 57 56 
    Adjusted R2 0.9873 0.9730 0.8025 
 
5.5 Estimation of the Normal Audit Fee Model 
Table 6 reports the regression results for the audit fee model during the period 
2005-2008. There are 2725 observations. The t values are presented on an adjusted 
level, using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level 
clustering. The Table 6 shows that the explanatory power of the model is 86%, 
suggesting that our audit fee determinants can explain a significant portion of the 
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variations in audit fees. In addition, most of the individual coefficients for our fee 
determinants in the audit fee model are highly significant with predicted signs. This 
model is the normal audit fee model used for calculating the difference between 
AFEE and normal audit fees therefore obtain the abnormal audit fees (AFEE).  Look 
at the Table 6, nearly all of the variables are positively correlated with the audit fees. 
And the variables LNTA, NBS, EMPLOY, FOREIGN, LOSS, LIQUIDITY, BIG4, 
CHGSALE and PENSION are significantly associated with the audit fees. We use this 
model to get the normal audit fee and calculate the abnormal audit fees.  
 
Table 6 Estimation of Normal Audit Fees 
Variables Predicted Sign AFEE 
LNTA + 0.412*** 
    -16.34 
NBS + 0.193*** 
    -5.54 
INVERC + -0.223 
    (-1.25) 
EMPLOY + 0.00292*** 
    -3.33 
FOREIGN + 0.381*** 
    -4.99 
LOSS + 0.193** 
    -2.87 
LOSSLAG + 0.0481 
    -0.65 
LEVE + 0.0394 
    -1.22 
ROA - 0.000331 
    (-0.26) 
LIQUIDITY - 0.0199** 
    (-3.16) 
BIG4 + 0.132* 
    -2 
BTM - 0.0000465 
    (-1.04) 
CHGSALE - 0.00657** 
    (-2.85) 
PENSION + 0.198* 
    (-2.52) 
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SHORT_TEN      - 0.12 
    (-1.34) 
_cons   -1.034*** 
    (-4.25) 
N   2725 
Adjusted R2   0.8661 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In Table 7, we can clearly see the distribution of the abnormal audit fees. Among all 
the sample firms, half of the observations are classified as having positive valued of 
ABAFEE, and the remaining firms have the negative values of ABAFEE. Therefore 
the mean or median value of ABAFEE is zero. Table 7 presents the distributional 
properties of ABAFEE for the full sample (N=2725), the subsample of clients with 
ABAFEE>0(N= 1487), and for the subsample of clients with ABAFEE<0(N=1238). 
As shown in Table 7, the residual values, which refer to the abnormal audit fees that 
obtained from the audit fee model, spread widely. The first and third quartile is -33.73% 
and 28.77% respectively, the inter-quartile range is 62.5%. The distribution of the 
positive abnormal fee is similar to the negative abnormal fee, which the inter-quartile 
is 40.46% and 40.61% separately. And the number of their median value is very close. 
It can be considered as a normal distribution.  
Table 7. Distributions of abnormal audit fees 
Variable ABAFEE ABAFEE>0 ABAFEE<0 
Mean -0.0379099 0.3669368 -0.4002526 
Std. Dev 0.5154454 0.2822132 0.3860748 
1% -1.441829 0.002595 -2.283338 
25% -0.3373732 0.1403682 -0.5517571 
Median -0.0224689 0.3044501 -0.3144876 
75% 0.2877218 0.5450008 -0.145695 
99% 1.105973 1.205786 -0.0040066 
N 2725 1487 1238 
 
5.6 Results of Multivariate Tests 
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5.6.1 Results of full sample on the association of unsigned discretionary 
accruals with abnormal audit fees, audit fees and absolute abnormal audit 
fees 
In this section, we examined abnormal audit fees paid to auditors during the period 
2005-2008 and found a relatively significant positive relation to the discretionary 
accruals. We used three metrics to assess audit quality: two accruals quality measured 
by the Jones Model and the modified Jones Model; the third one is the 
performance-adjusted model. We first estimate Eq.(5) using the full sample of 2725 
firms which include observations with both positive and negative abnormal fees. 
Table 8 reports the regression results using the three measurements of discretionary 
accruals as the dependent variable. We separate them into three sections. In each 
section, the first column presents the results of regression using abnormal audit 
fee(ABAFEE) as a measure of auditors¶ economic bounding to clients while the 
second column reports the same regression using actual audit fees(AFEE). In the third 
column, the absolute value of abnormal audit fees is used, denoted by |ABAFEE|.  
The model shown in Table 8 has an adjusted R2 of average 25 percent when using 
the |DA1| and |DA2|, while the |DA3| has 97 percent which suggests a significant 
portion of the variation in discretionary accruals. Whereas the results presented by the 
third model are not significant. Therefore, we will focus on the significant regression 
results using the second model. A close look into the regression results, we can find 
that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is significantly positive associated with 
ABAFEE and AFEE. The results are consistent with evidence reported in Frankel et al. 
(2002) who report a significant coefficient on their audit fee metrics. According to 
Frankel et al. (2002), the audit fees are negatively associated with unsigned 
discretionary accruals. However, our empirical evidence proves that auditors are not 
compromised by higher abnormal audit fees and could still remain independence. 
Choi et al. (2005) had separated the full sample into two subsamples; one is the firms 
with all positive abnormal fees and the other with all negative abnormal fees to see 
any differences. Here we revisit the regression to check whether the sign of the 
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abnormal fee will influence the results.  
 
Table 8. Full sample results on the association of unsigned discretionary accruals 
with abnormal audit fees, audit fees and absolute abnormal audit fees 
 Section A 
Using |DA1| as the dependent variables 
          Section B 
Using |DA2| as the dependent variables 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b) 
ABAFEE 0.000707   0.00911*   
 (0.04)   (2.16)   
AFEE  0.00875*   0.00911*  
  (2.10)   (2.16)  
|ABAFE
E| 
  0.0338   .0117 
   (1.61)   (0.55) 
LNTA -0.0192**
*
 
-0.0155***   -0.0145*** -0.0148*** -0.0148*** -0.0142**
*
 
 (-4.76) (-4.74) (-4.46) (-4.47) (-4.47) (-4.30) 
LEVE -0.0638**
*
 
-0.0717*** -0.0725*** -0.0752*** -0.0752*** -0.0757**
*
 
 (-7.43) (-10.58) (-10.74) (-10.98) (-10.98) (-11.03) 
BIG4 -0.00023
7 
0.00779 0.00846 -0.00257 -0.00257 -0.00368 
 (-0.01) (0.46) (0.05) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.22) 
BTM -0.00001
97 
-0.000001
43 
-0.000005
09 
-0.000005
23 
-0.000005
23 
-0.00001
12 
 (-0.37) (-0.04) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.27) 
CFO 0.000071
6 
0.000160 0.0000364 -0.000156 -0.000156 -0.00020
2 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.12) 
CHGSA
LE 
-0.00334 -0.00716 -0.00858 -0.0459** -0.0459** -0.0479**
*
 
 (-0.23) (-0.50) (-0.61) (-3.20) (-3.20) (-3.33) 
AUDCH
G 
0.0313 0.0403 0.0421 0.0553* 0.0553* 0.0571* 
 (0.97) (1.51) (1.59) (2.06) (2.06) (2.12) 
_cons 0.545*** 0.461*** 0.481*** 0.479*** 0.479*** 0.514*** 
 (10.85) (10.19) (11.46) (10.46) (10.46) (12.05) 
N 2725      
Adjusted  
R2 
0.1729 0.2715 0.2699 0.1670 0.2954 0.2896 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White¶s(1980) consistent standard error estimates to 
correct for heteroskedasticity.  t statistics in parentheses,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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      Section  C 
         Using |DA3| as the dependent variables 
  (1c) (2c) (3c) 
ABAFEE -0.00857     
  (-0.57)     
AFEE         0.00628   
            -1.47   
|ABAFEE|          -0.0399 
      (-1.86) 
LNTA -0.0143*** -0.0128*** -0.0130*** 
  (-3.86) (-3.83) (-3.92) 
LEVE 0.00667 0.00241 0.00211 
  -0.85 -0.35 -0.31 
BIG4 0.0251 0.0162 0.0135 
  -1.3 -0.93 -0.79 
BTM -0.0000192 -0.0000176 -0.0000253 
  (-0.40) (-0.42) (-0.61) 
CFO -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.236*** 
  (-120.12) (-138.43) (-139.45) 
CHGSALE 0.0645*** -0.0255 -0.0290* 
  -4.78 (-1.75) (-2.01) 
AUDCHG 0.0275 0.0358 0.0379 
  -0.93 -1.31 -1.4 
_cons 0.218*** 0.197*** 0.247*** 
  -4.74 -4.25 -5.76 
N 2725     
Adjusted R2     0.9694 0.979 0.9792 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White¶s(1980) consistent standard error estimates to 
correct for heteroskedasticity.t statistics in parentheses,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
5.6.2 Results of Subsample results on the association between 
discretionary accruals and abnormal audit fees 
Table 9 presents the subsample results on the association between discretionary 
accruals and abnormal audit fees. When we separated the samples with different signs, 
the results summarized to two parts.  The ABAFEE is negatively associated with the 
unsigned discretionary accruals when abnormal audit fees are positive. And when 
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abnormal audit fees are negative, the ABAFEE is positively correlated with the 
unsigned discretionary accruals. However, this is contrary to Choi et al.(2005) who 
report the asymmetry discretionary accruals-audit fee association between the two 
distinct samples suggests that the structure of auditors¶ incentives to compromise 
audit quality differs systematically for clients with positive abnormal fees( the more 
profitable clients) vs. clients with negative abnormal fees( the less profitable clients). 
Our results is remain stable with the previous results suggest that auditors are not 
compromised by higher abnormal audit fees and could still remain independence. 
  
Table 9 Subsample results on the association between discretionary accruals and 
abnormal audit fees 
Section A Section B 
Using |DA1| as the dependent variable Using |DA2| as the dependent variable 
  (1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) 
  ABAFEE>0 ABAFEE<0 ABAFEE>0 ABAFEE<0 
ABAFEE -0.0319 0.33 -0.0109 0.369 
  (-0.21) -1.39 (-0.09) -1.31 
LNTA -0.0468 -0.0554 -0.0393 -0.0603 
  (-1.68) (-1.77) (-1.72) (-1.62) 
LEVE -0.0635 0.127 -0.0731 0.199 
  (-1.29) -1.4 (-1.82) -1.84 
BIG4 -0.0282 -0.0172 -0.0332 0.0486 
  (-0.20) (-0.10) (-0.28) -0.25 
BTM -0.00427 0.0000165 -0.00298 0.000178 
  (-0.98) -0.06 (-0.84) -0.53 
CHGSALE 0.835*** 0.538*** 0.587*** 0.530*** 
  -11.18 -29.01 -9.62 -24.03 
CFO -0.0147 -0.991*** -0.012 -0.981*** 
  (-1.38) (-69.67) (-1.38) (-57.99) 
AUDCHG 0.732** 0.152 0.629*** -0.14 
  -3.32 -0.63 -3.49 (-0.49) 
_cons 0.763* 0.508 0.739** 0.321 
  -2.28 -1.21 -2.7 -0.64 
N 2725       
Adjusted R2 0.5842 0.5988 0.4219 0.4879 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Section C 
Using |DA3| as dependent variable 
  (1c) (2c) 
  ABAFEE>0 ABAFEE<0 
ABAFEE -0.0694 0.484 
  (-0.61) -1.37 
LNTA -0.0176 -0.0785 
  (-0.84) (-1.69) 
LEVE 0.0243 0.239 
  -0.65 -1.77 
BIG4 -0.0212 0.0943 
  (-0.20) -0.38 
BTM -0.0025 0.000272 
  (-0.76) -0.64 
CHGSALE 0.747*** 0.535*** 
  -13.25 -19.38 
CFO -0.248*** -0.975*** 
  (-30.73) (-46.05) 
AUDCHG 0.385* -0.312 
  -2.32 (-0.87) 
_cons 0.141 0.397 
  -0.56 -0.63 
N 2725   
Adjusted R2     0.4932 0.4693 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
5.6.3 Analysis other variables 
Then we watch the other dependent variables in Table 8. The coefficients on LNTA 
are significantly negative in all cases, suggesting larger size firms are less likely to 
compromise the audit quality. The coefficients on LEVE are significantly negative 
when using the |DA1| and |DA2| while insignificantly positive in using |DA3|. The 
coefficients on BIG4 auditors are negative but not significant which cannot prove that 
the BIG4 auditors are more effective than non-BIG4 auditors in constraining 
opportunistic earnings management. But we will examine the variable BIG4 in the 
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later section. The coefficient on BTM is negatively insignificant in all cases. The 
variable CFO is negatively significant using the third model for discretionary accruals 
suggesting that higher operating cash flow firms can reduce the probability of 
opportunistic earnings management. The coefficients on CHGSALE are different in 
all cases, part is negative and part is positive. The coefficients on AUDCHG are 
positively insignificant in all cases.  
 
5.7 Additional tests 
  In this section, we will do some additional tests to examine the hypotheses made 
before and conclude the results of some specific variables associated with the audit 
quality.  
5.7.1 Results of Non-audit fee and discretionary accruals 
Firstly, we replace the abnormal audit fee by the non-audit fee and re-estimate the 
Equation (5). The results presented in Table 10. Though we regress through three 
different models, the results tend to be similar. The non-audit fees are negatively 
correlated with the discretionary accruals. This result suggests that the non-audit fees 
would not impair the audit quality. The higher of the non-audit fees, the lower of the 
discretionary accruals. But the non-audit fees are not significantly correlated with the 
discretionary accruals. Therefore the hypothesis 3 is rejected.  
Table 10 Results on the association between Non-audit fees and audit quality 
Variables     |DA1|       |DA2|    |DA3| 
Non-audit fees -0.000288 -0.000403 -0.000317 
 (-0.30) (-0.42) (-0.44) 
LNTA 0.185 0.203* 0.155* 
 (1.80) (2.01) (2.01) 
LEVE -0.0742 -0.0801 0.0142 
 (-0.53) (-0.58) (0.14) 
BIG4 -0.631 -0.612 -0.414 
 (-1.68) (-1.66) (-1.46) 
BTM 0.00931*** 0.00935*** 0.00716*** 
 (14.64) (14.92) (14.92) 
CHGSALE 0.380*** 0.402*** 0.500*** 
 (6.91) (7.41) (12.03) 
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CFO -0.397*** -0.396*** -0.537*** 
 (-15.54) (-15.73) (-27.86) 
AUDCHG -0.921 -1.076 -0.920* 
 (-1.61) (-1.91) (-2.13) 
_cons -1.422 -1.611 -1.533 
 (-1.31) (-1.50) (-1.87) 
N 386   
Adjusted R2 0.7651 0.7712 0.8703 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Most of the research investigated whether the provision of non-audit services 
decrease auditor independence using the ratios of non-audit fees to total fees, which 
refers to the fee ratio, as the measure of the economic bond. However, the fee ratio 
does not capture the economic importance of the client to the audit firm. Here, we use 
another two measurements to examine the impact of non-audit fee on the audit quality, 
first one is to re-estimate Eq. (5) using abnormal NAS fees (ABAFEE) and the other 
is using the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees (FEERATIO) as the dependent variable. 
  As shown in Table 11, the results of regression using abnormal NAS fee are 
presented. Here the abnormal NAS fees are defined as abnormal NAS fees deflated by 
natural log of NAS fees. And similar to the abnormal fees, the abnormal NAS fees 
obtained from the Eq.(4) using NAS fees(instead of audit fees) as the dependent 
variable. We divided the sample into two sections, section A is the regression results 
of the abnormal NAS fees while section B shows the results of ratios of NAS fees to 
audit fees.  
  In columns (1a) and (2a) of section A, the coefficient on ABNAFEE is insignificant 
positive associate with the discretionary accruals; hence H3 that non-audit fees has a 
significant association with the audit quality is rejected. The overall results for both 
subsamples are insignificant positive. In Section B, the results is similar to Section A. 
The coefficient on FEERATIO is also insignificant associate with the discretionary 
accruals. We document a positive association between the absolute value of firm¶s 
discretionary current accruals and fee ratio, regardless of which performance-adjusted 
accrual measure is used. However, we find little evidence supporting the claim that 
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auditors violate their independence as the result of clients paying high fees or having 
high fee ratios. This is consistent with Chung and Kallapur¶s(2003) findings that there 
is no association between their audit fee metrics and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals measured with the modified Jones model(Ashbaugh et al., 
2003).  
                                 Table 11   
Results of regression of |DA1| on abnormal non-audit fees, fee ratio 
Using |DA1| as the dependent variable 
Section A Section B 
  (1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) 
                        
ABNAFEE>0 ABNAFEE<0 FEERATIO>1 FEERATIO<1 
ABAFEE 0.322 0.0426     
  -0.73 -0.79     
  
    
  0.0108 
FEERATIO  
 -0.77 
0.989  
  -1.5   
LNTA 0.0269 0.282 -0.131 -0.0000769 
  -0.1 -0.76 (-1.45) (-0.00) 
BIG4 -0.444 0.00894 -0.654 -0.00233 
  (-0.32) -0.24 (-1.46) (-0.03) 
BTM -0.333 0.417*** 0.00922*** 0.00113 
  (-1.19) -4.9 -13.33 -0.28 
CHGSALE -1.777 -0.121 0.333*** 0.197*** 
  (-0.54) (-0.73) -6.03 -4.56 
LEVE 0.0826 -1.936*** -0.0541 -0.0403 
  -0.14 (-13.15) (-0.34) (-0.88) 
CFO 0.0166 -0.122 -0.402*** -1.242*** 
  -0.64 (-0.35) (-14.55) (-13.49) 
AUDCHG 1.688 -0.18 -0.408 -0.390** 
  -1.63 (-0.38) (-0.66) (-2.69) 
_cons 0.979 0.258 -0.545 0.35 
  -0.31 -0.32 (-0.53) -1.41 
N 2725       
Adjusted R2    0.298 0.941 0.7611 0.6155 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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  In summary, the insignificant coefficients on ABNFEE and FEERATIO for both 
subsamples, along with the significant coefficients on ABAFEE only for the positive 
ABAFEE as reported in Table 8 suggest that the significant associations between 
unsigned accruals and abnormal total fees that we observed in Table 10 are primarily 
driven by abnormal audit fees rather than abnormal NAS fees.  
 
5.7.2 Results of BIG4& Non-BIG4 association with the audit quality 
  To examine whether firms that audited by BIG4 would influence the audit quality, 
we separated the samples into two groups, one group that audited by the BIG4, the 
other group audited by the Non-BIG4. And we use three sections based on the three 
measurements of the discretionary accruals. We re-estimate the equation (5) for the 
year 2005.  Each section contains the BIG4 group and Non-BIG4 group. A close 
look at the Table 12, we can find that only using the |DA3| can result in a high 
explanatory power of 95% and 99%. It interprets the evidence that when firms audited 
by BIG4 the ABAFEE are negatively correlated with the discretionary accruals and 
firms that audited by Non-BIG4 the ABAFEE are positively associated with the 
discretionary accruals. We thus can conclude that firms that audited by BIG4 are more 
likely to have a high level of audit quality than firms that audited by Non-BIG4. This 
result supports the hypothesis 4. Because high quality auditors have the expertise, 
resources, and incentives to separate the information component from noise, they can 
enhance the informativeness of discretionary accruals by constraining aggressive and 
opportunist reporting of accruals by managers ( Krishnan, 2002). 
 
Table 12 results of the BIG4 and Non-BIG4 association with the audit quality 
 Section  A Section  B 
 
 
Using |DA1| as the dependent variables Using |DA2| as the dependent 
variables 
  Non-BIG4 BIG4 Non-BIG4 BIG4 
ABAFEE 0.105 0.00323 0.0798 0.0132 
  -0.89 -0.25 -0.56 -0.69 
LNTA -0.0692* 0.00124 -0.0582 -0.00132 
  (-2.43) -0.39 (-1.68) (-0.28) 
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LEVE 0.0827 0.0172 0.0946 0.0228 
  -1.67 -1.59 -1.57 -1.44 
BIG4 0 0 0 0 
BTM 0.000204 0.00000836 0.000565 -0.0000307 
  -0.76 -0.02 -1.73 (-0.05) 
CHGSALE 0.526*** 0.0217 0.499*** 0.218*** 
  -30.1 -1.78 -23.41 -12.23 
CFO -0.984*** 0.000334 -0.961*** -0.00073 
  (-73.84) -0.28 (-59.18) (-0.42) 
AUDCHG 0.123 0.00404 -0.296 -0.0133 
  -0.57 -0.16 (-1.12) (-0.35) 
_cons 0.54 -0.00648 0.396 -0.0114 
  -1.64 (-0.11) -0.99 (-0.14) 
N 2725       
Adjusted R2 0.9805 0.0279 0.9707 0.4132 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
         Section C 
            Using |DA3| as the dependent variable 
  Non-BIG4 BIG4 
ABAFEE 0.0902 -0.0121 
  -0.52 (-1.08) 
LNTA -0.0751 0.00255 
  (-1.81) -0.93 
LEVE 0.169* 0.00147 
  -2.33 -0.16 
BIG4 0 0 
BTM 0.00049 0.0000336 
  -1.25 -0.09 
CHGSALE 0.525*** 0.204*** 
  -20.55 -19.6 
CFO -0.966*** -0.237*** 
  (-49.66) (-232.27) 
AUDCHG -0.449 0.011 
  (-1.41) -0.5 
_cons 0.299 0.0202 
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  -0.62 -0.42 
N 2725   
Adjusted R2         0.9587 0.9964 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
5.8 Summary for the Hypotheses Test  
  Table 13 shows the results of the hypotheses association we tested.  
                              Table 13 
The summary of the hypotheses and the findings-the association between the 
audit fees and audit quality  
Hypotheses Findings 
H1: There is a positively relationship between the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals and abnormal audit fees when the clients pay 
positive abnormal audit fees. 
Supported 
H2: There is a negatively relationship between the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals and abnormal audit fees when the clients pay 
negative abnormal audit fees.  
Not Supported 
H3: There is a significantly relationship between the non-audit 
fee and discretionary accruals.  
Not Supported 
H4: There is a negatively relationship between the firms audited 
by BIG 4 and discretionary accruals.  
 Supported 
 
5.9 Further analysis and robustness test 
  The results above we have got needed further analysis to check the 
heteroscedasticity and muticollinearity. We use the Breush-Pagan or Cook-Weiberg 
test to do the check for the fee-quality model. If the p-value is significant, then the 
null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is constant would be rejected. Hence 
the heteroscdasticity is proved to be existed. As shown in table 14, the p-value is 
significant means that the variance of residuals is not constant. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis has to be rejected.  
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Table 14 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of var1 
chi2(1) = 19439.75 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
  The table 4 has shown the Perason correlation matrix results. Here we calculate the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance value to check whether the 
muticollinaerrity exist. The results are presented in Table 15. If the variables have VIF 
values greater than 10 or tolerance values lower than 0.10, then they are considered to 
have multicollinearity problems(Gujarati, 2003:339). All the variables have VIF 
values that are approximately 1.00 to 4.11 and tolerance values that are higher than 
0.10 this suggests no multicollinearity problems exists.  
 
Table 15 
VIF and tolerance value for fee-quality model  
Variables                  VIF                     Tolerance 
|DA1|                     4.11                      0.2431 
ABAFEE                  1.00                      0.9957 
LNTA                     1.54                      0.6485 
LEVE                     1.01                      0.9874 
BIG4                      1.55                      0.6467 
BTM                      2.50                      0.4001 
CFO                      1.14                      0.8760 
CHGSALE                 2.77                      0.3614 
AUGCHG                 1.04                       0.9596 
Mean VIF                  1.85 
 
  Last but not the least, we examine the robustness of our findings. Firstly, we 
re-estimate the regression of the Eq.(5) using the percentage measure of abnormal 
audit fees, which is the abnormal fees divided by total audit fees. It doesn¶t appear to 
be much different from the previous one. Then we check whether the results are 
different through our period of 2005 to 2008, each year of the sample are regressed. 
As we expected, in 2008 the results is quite different from before because the 
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financial crisis have an effect on the outcomes. Third, we re-estimate the regression 
by eliminating extreme tail observations to examine the factors of outliers, the result 
remain the same level and not fluctuant too much. In a word, the sample that we 
chosen is stationary over the period except the year 2008. 
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                     Section VI Summary and Conclusion  
6.1 Overview, summary and conclusion of the study  
  Audit quality and earnings management have been the focus of the researcherV¶ 
debate in the recent years. It concerns the future development of the firms which 
depend on the audit service. Since the accruals can let managers communicate their 
private and inside information, the economic value then will be increased. To measure 
the level of the audit quality, we use the discretionary accruals as the proxy of the 
audit quality. In this paper, we applied three models for the audit quality in case there 
is any biases exist. Furthermore, we focus on the audit fees which have a relationship 
with the audit quality. The audit fees mainly contain two parts, the normal audit fees 
and the abnormal audit fees. The normal audit fees, as we all know, reflect auditors¶ 
effort costs, litigation risk and normal profits, while the abnormal audit fees which 
specific to the auditor-client relationship may influence the results of the financial 
reporting. Based on these predictions, we developed the fee-quality model to provide 
empirical evidence.  
  Our findings are consistent with some previous researches. We found that the 
abnormal audit fees are significantly negative associated with the discretionary 
accruals. Our empirical evidence proves that auditors are not compromised by higher 
abnormal audit fees and could still remain independence. We examine some 
additional tests and find that the variable BIG4 will improve the audit quality while 
the non-audit fees are not significantly correlated with audit quality.  
6.2 Limitations of the study 
Though our study provides useful insight into current debate about the dependence 
of the auditor, there still exist some limitations about the investigation. First, we use 
the data during the period 2005 to 2008, followed by the financial crisis that has a 
significant influence on our research. Secondly, we utilize accruals to construct our 
measures of earnings quality. It is well known that using accruals might be a noisy 
proxy for management¶s discretion over earnings. Though we have attempted to 
control for the effects of year and industry dummies on accruals, the measurement 
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errors cannot be rule out in the discretionary measures. Third, we include abnormal 
fees in our empirical analysis to address concerns relative to client importance and fee 
composition. Although we compute abnormal fees using fee prediction models that 
appear to be well-specified, we cannot rule out the possibility of an unknown degree 
of model misstatement, and omitted variables, on our results. Finally, our results are 
driven by the inability of our empirical analyses to adequately capture the impact of 
unobservable risk. Though we attempt to explore this possibility employing a variety 
of alternatives, our results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
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